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Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of price floor regulations on the organization and per-
formance of markets. The standard interpretation of the effects of these policies is concerned
with short-run market distortions associated with excess supply. Since price controls prevent
markets from clearing, they lead to higher prices. While this analysis may be correct in the
short-run, it does not consider the dynamic equilibrium consequences of price controls. We
demonstrate that price floor regulations can have important long-run effects on the the struc-
ture of markets by crowding them and creating endogenous barriers to entry for low-cost re-
tailers. Moreover, we show that these factors can indirectly lower productivity and possibly
even prices. We test this in the context of an actual regulation imposed in the retail gasoline
market in the Canadian province of Que´bec and show that the policy led to more competi-
tion between smaller/less efficient stations. This resulted in lowered sales, and, despite the
reduction in efficiency, did not increase prices.
1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, many retail markets around the world have experienced significant
restructuring, associated with the exit of small independent stores and the entry of large-scale
chains. These changes were triggered by technological innovations that lowered the marginal cost
of serving consumers, at the expense of higher fixed costs of operation.1 The success of Walmart is
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1See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) for an empirical analysis of these trends in the context of U.S. retail
markets, and Campbell and Hubbard (2010) for an analysis of the reorganization of service stations on U.S. highways.
a well documented example (see Jia (2008) and Holmes (2010)), but similar patterns exist in other
markets. For instance, the North-American retail hardware and gasoline markets experienced
important shifts towards fewer and larger volume retail outlets.
In some cases, lobbying groups were able to convince local and state governments to impose
various kinds of price-control regulations in order to protect small independent retailers from this
reorganization.2 A common example of this type of regulation is a below-cost law, also known as a
“fair-trade” policy, which prevents firms from posting prices below a stated level, approximating
the cost of a representative firm. This effectively imposes a minimum resale-price maintenance
policy common to all stores.
The impact of this type of regulation is not well understood by economists and policy makers.
The traditional textbook evaluation of price floors is concerned with short-run market distortions
associated with excess supply. While this analysis may be correct in the short run, it ignores
the long-run equilibrium effects of price controls on the composition of industries. The central
objective of this paper is to demonstrate that price-floor regulations can have an important long-
run impact on the structure of markets. We argue in particular that these policies can crowd
markets with smaller/less efficient retailers and create an endogenous barrier to entry for low-
cost retailers. Taken together, these factors may indirectly lower productivity and affect prices.
To describe the mechanism that drives the long-run impact of the price floor on market struc-
ture we construct a model of entry and price competition. The model shows that a price-floor
regulation has two opposite effects. First, such a policy causes excess entry into and crowding of
markets by raising the expected profit of being active. Second, by protecting small firms the policy
blocks the entry of more efficient low marginal cost retailers who face larger fixed costs. Together
these forces lead to lower average volume per station in markets subject to a price floor. This is
due both to the fact that a greater fraction of small technology stations leads to lower volume per
station, and to the fact that increased competition reduces the market share of each station. Fur-
thermore, these forces can lead to higher or lower prices depending on the relative efficiency of
firms and the level of the floor.
We analyze this question empirically by studying a specific below-cost price regulation insti-
tuted in 1997 in the retail gasoline market in the Canadian province of Que´bec. For our analysis
we have constructed a rich data set at the gasoline-station level featuring close to 1600 stations ob-
served between 1991 and 2001 in five cities in the province of Que´bec, and nine cities in three other
Canadian provinces where the regulation was not implemented. The data, containing detailed in-
formation on individual stations’ sales volume, posted price, exact location and characteristics,
allow us to study the effect of the floor on station behavior at the local-market level.
We perform a detailed econometric analysis comparing the behavior of local markets and sta-
2Throughout the paper we will refer interchangeably to these types of policies as: price controls, price floors, sales-
below-cost laws, below-cost-sales laws, and unfair sales acts. All refer to legislation that limits the prices firms can set
either in a particular industry, or broadly across all products.
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tions in regulated and unregulated regions. The results are in line with the model predictions.
We show that the policy slowed down industry reorganization, discouraging large stations from
entering and allowing more smaller stations to survive. In Que´bec, following the policy, stations
became more homogeneous in terms of amenities and sizes, and less spatially differentiated. Im-
portantly, we find that these changes in the structure of local markets significantly reduced per-
station sales volumes, a common measure of productivity in this industry. We also show that the
regulation did not lead to higher prices in the long-run. This suggests that the upward pressure of
the policy on prices, caused by a reduction in efficiency and the floor constraint itself, was at least
offset by the long-run increase in competition that we document.
While our focus is on the effect of the policy on market structure, most of the existing em-
pirical analysis evaluating the effect of gasoline market regulations has focused on the impact
on prices. Fenili and Lane (1985), Anderson and Johnson (1999) and Johnson (1999) evaluate the
effect of sales-below-cost laws in retail gasoline markets in the U.S. They find that jurisdictions
with sales-below-cost laws have higher prices and/or margins than those without. These studies
are all cross-sectional and, therefore, cannot account for the unobserved heterogeneity across ju-
risdictions. Their conclusions, linking sales-below-cost laws with higher prices may therefore be
spurious. Not all of the prior empirical literature on below-cost regulations concludes that they
lead to higher prices. A recent study by Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2005) finds that prices tend
to fall after the adoption of sales-below-cost laws in US gasoline markets. They argue informally
that such regulations could affect market structure, and then use a monthly panel of state-level
prices for thirty states, over a twenty year period and investigate empirically what happens to the
number of stations. Closest to our analysis, Johnson and Romeo (2000) study the effect of a related
policy aimed at protecting independent retailers: a ban on self-service gasoline stations in New
Jersey and Oregon. They find that the bans slowed the penetration of convenience store tie-ins,
but do not seem to achieve their objective of protecting smaller stations. They also find that the
ban led to higher prices.
Our paper is also linked to a large literature that studies the effect of different forms of gov-
ernment intervention on market structure and prices. Another form of government intervention
is the imposition of environmental regulations, and studies such as Brown, Hastings, Mansur, and
Villas-Boas (2008), Ryan (2006) and Busse and Keohane (2009) have looked at the effect of gasoline
content regulation and of the Clean Air Act on market structure. There are also studies evaluating
the impact of advertising restrictions on competition and prices in various industries (Milyo and
Waldfogel (1999) study the effect of a ban on price advertising, while Clark (2007) looks at the ef-
fect of a ban on advertising directed at children on competition in the cereal market and Tan (2006)
considers advertising restrictions in cigarette markets). Theoretical work by Armstrong, Vickers,
and Zhou (2009) points out that in markets with costly information acquisition, regulations de-
signed to protect consumers, such as price caps or measures which enable consumers to refuse to
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receive advertising, could have the unintended consequence reducing consumers’ incentives to
become informed, resulting in softened price competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the minimum
price regulation in the Que´bec gasoline market and relate it to other below-cost price regulations.
In the Section 3 we present the model that characterizes the distortions caused by minimum price
regulations. In Section 4 we describe our data and present the empirical analysis. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 Price floor regulations
A key feature of the retail gasoline industry is the reorganization that took place in the 1990’s.
During this period all North American markets underwent a major reorganization, characterized
by an increase in the size and automation of stations, and the exit of nearly 30% of stations active
at the beginning of the decade (see for instance Eckert and West (2005)).3 These changes took place
through the entry and reconfiguration of larger and more efficient stations, and the exit of smaller
stations. They were caused by technological innovations common to most retailing sectors which
increased the efficient size of stores (e.g. automation of the service, better inventory control sys-
tems, etc.), by changes in the value of certain amenities (e.g. decreased use of small repair garages),
and by changes in regulations regarding the environmental safety of underground storage tanks
(see Yin, Kunreuther, and White (2007) and Eckert and Eckert (2008)).4 Most regulatory changes
and technological innovations took place in the early 1990s, and were slowly implemented across
Canadian markets over the decade.
These changes to retail gasoline markets were accompanied by an increase in the frequency
of price wars due to excess capacity. In light of these events, the Que´bec government decided
to regulate gasoline prices to protect small independent retailers. In the lead-up to the enact-
ment of the law, Que´bec’s association of independent gasoline retailers conducted a very effective
lobbying operation aimed at convincing the provincial government that the exit of independent
retailers would adversely affect consumers in the long-run. Several consumer protection groups
3In the US, the number of retail outlets selling gasoline declined from approximately 202 thousand to 171 thousand
from 1994 to 2001. Yin, Kunreuther, and White (2007) describe the reorganization of several US gasoline markets
throughout the 1990s.
4The Environmental Code of Practice for Underground Storage Tank Systems Containing Petroleum Products was
published in Canada in 1988 and provided guidance on appropriate upgrading and removal behavior for storage tanks.
It was left up to individual provinces whether they adopted these guidelines or established their own regulation. In
both Que´bec and Ontario, regulation came into effect around 1991 regarding approval of unprotected tanks. In terms
of timing these restrictions seem to be very similar. In Que´bec all tanks not meeting the protection standards were to
be removed within two to seven years, depending on the age of the tank as of July 1991. In Ontario, no approval was
to be given for unprotected tanks that had not been upgraded and they would have to be removed by 1997. Given the
similarity in terms of timing, the only remaining concern would be with regard to the extent to which these regulations
were enforced in the two provinces. We have found no evidence that there were any differences in enforcement across
both regions, but we will nevertheless focus on the years before 1993 and after 1999 and avoid drawing conclusions
from the behavior of the markets during the interim period when the policy was implemented.
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also supported the policy at the time. The objective of the policy is to protect small retailers against
aggressive pricing strategies from large chains and big-box retailers, such as Walmart or Costco.5
The law on petroleum products was enacted at the beginning of 1997 and administrated by the
Re´gie de l’e´nergie du Que´bec (hereafter the “Board”). This followed the occurrence of an im-
portant price war during the summer of 1996, which was deemed by the Board to be the result of
predatory pricing behavior by the major retailing chains. However, it is not actually clear that pre-
dation was actually the cause. Instead, the price wars were likely triggered by excess capacity, and
by the decision of Que´bec’s largest retailer (Ultramar) to implement a low-price guarantee (LPG)
policy for all of its affiliated stations at the beginning of the summer 1996. Indeed, an investigation
by the Canadian Competition Bureau never uncovered predatory behavior.
The mandate of the Board is threefold:
1. Monitor the gasoline industry, and gather information on prices.
2. Determine a weekly floor price or Minimum Estimated Price (MEP).
3. Prevent the occurrence of price wars by imposing a minimum margin regulation in a desig-
nated geographic market.
The determination of the MEP is given by the following simple rule which measures the aver-
age marginal cost of selling gasoline in each local market:
MEPmt = wt + τmt + Tmt,
where wt is the minimum wholesale price at the terminal, τmt is an estimate of the transportation
cost to deliver gasoline from the refinery to marketm, and Tmt is the sum of federal and provincial
taxes. The MEP is calculated and posted on the website of the Board every Monday.
The role of the MEP is to set a price floor under which a firm can sue its competitor(s) for
financial compensation on the basis of “excessive and unreasonable commercial practices.” This
new feature of the law facilitates suing procedures between competitors in the market, in a fashion
similar to anti-dumping laws.
In cases where companies repeatedly fail to respect the MEP, the regulation provides the Board
with the ability to impose an additional minimum margin to the MEP. It allows the Board to add
$0.03 per liter to the calculation of the MEP in a specific region after the occurrence of a period of
sufficiently low prices.
The minimum margin serves two purposes. First, it establishes an implicit (or long run) price
floor, under which the Board considers that stations are not covering their fixed operating costs.
Second, it enables the Board to indirectly compensate stations after a price war.
5Other provinces have also considered implementing similar policies. During the same period that the adoption
of the floor was being debated in Que´bec, a similar regulation was discussed in Ontario, but ultimately was rejected.
Nova-Scotia, New-Brunswick and Prince Edward Island all adopted similar regulations after 2001.
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The mechanics of the policy are roughly as follows. First, after the occurrence of a long enough
low-price period, a gasoline retailer can ask the Board to investigate evidence of price anomalies.
The Board then conducts a formal consultation of different groups (retailers, consumer protection
groups), in order to evaluate the credibility of the predatory accusation. If the Board is convinced
of the accusation, it can add $0.03 per liter to the calculation of the MEP for a certain period of
time in a specific geographic zone where the price war occurred. In practice the Board considers
that a price is predatory if the margin (price minus the MEP) is below $0.03 per liter for a month
or more.
This minimum margin approximates the average operating cost of a representative station in
the province.6 The geographic zone typically includes all local markets which suffered from the
price war. Similarly, the length of time for which the minimum margin is applicable is proportional
to the length of time of the price war.
The minimum margin has been put in effect three times in two different markets, St-Je´rome
and Que´bec city. In St-Je´rome (North of Montre´al), it was added to the MEP from April of 2002 to
February of 2003, and again from December of 2003 to June of 2005. The imposition of this price
floor followed the entry of Costco in St-Je´rome in 2000, which drove the market price to the MEP
level for more than a year. In Que´bec city it was added to the MEP from July to October of 2001.
Its imposition followed a severe price war in the Que´bec City metropolitan area, during the fall of
2000.
Finally, our experience from studying the Que´bec gasoline regulation is that the price floor is
rarely observed to be binding, although the minimum margin has been put into effect on a few
occasions. Figure 1 presents the evolution of weekly average price in Que´bec city, along with the
price floor and the average retail margin.7 The dots identify weeks when the average market price
was equal to or smaller than the price floor, and the two vertical lines indicate the imposition of
the additional minimum margin. Over the period studied, the floor is thus binding less than 10%
of the time.
2.1 Below-cost price regulations elsewhere
Currently, twenty-four states in the US have general sales-below-costs laws. In Europe, France re-
cently strengthened a below-cost price regulation applied to all retail markets through the passage
of the Galland law in 1997. Biscourp, Boutin, and Verge´ (2008) look at the impact of the Galland
law in France, focusing on the consequences of limiting intra-brand competition on prices. They
find that the 1997 reform led to higher prices and softened competition from large grocery store
chains.
6After public consultations, the Board decided that the representative station is a self-service station operating a
convenience store and having annual sales of 350 million liters.
7We calculate the floor as the rack price (including taxes) plus transportation cost of 0.34, which reflects its 2001
value.
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Figure 1: Evolution of average prices, margins and floor in Que´bec City between 1991 and 2001
A number of other states and countries have laws for specific industries or products. The most
common are sales-below-costs restrictions in the retail gasoline market, but other markets feature
similar restrictions.8 For instance, in Tennessee there are price floors in the markets for cigarettes,
milk, and frozen desserts. In Ireland, below-invoice sales were banned in the retail grocery in-
dustry until 2005. More generally, similar policies have been enacted in other contexts: wages
in most labor markets are subject to explicit floors as are prices in many agricultural markets,
anti-dumping policies forbid foreign firms from setting price below average variable costs, and
the entry of big-box retailers is often restricted. In each case, the policies are designed to protect
particular groups of firms.
The debate over whether to adopt or overturn sales-below-cost restrictions is ongoing in many
jurisdictions. The advocates of these policies typically associate aggressive pricing with predatory
or loss-leading behavior. On the other hand, detractors argue that they protect inefficient firms
and lead to higher prices and, more generally, to welfare loss – arguments that are consistent with
the short-run distortions predicted by the textbook evaluation of price floors. Antitrust authorities
typically view such legislation as unnecessary, and they point out that state governments may be
too easily convinced by accusation of predation made by various interest groups. When asked to
evaluate the merit of proposed below-cost sales legislation in Virginia and North Carolina in 2002
and 2003 respectively, the Federal Trade Commission argued that anticompetitive below-cost pric-
8Currently nine U.S. states and three Canadian provinces have sales-below-cost laws in the retail gasoline market.
7
ing rarely occurs, and that such legislation could harm consumers.9 Similarly, in February 2009
following a lawsuit brought by gasoline retailer Flying J, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled as
unconstitutional a local statute which guaranteed a 9.18% markup over the average posted ter-
minal price for gasoline retailers.10 In Canada, the Competition Bureau has stated that regulation
of this type results in higher average prices, and that it does not provide for the highest quality
products and the most efficient production, relative to competitive markets.11
3 Theoretical model
We construct a model of entry and price competition, and evaluate the impact of a price floor on
the structure of the market. Specifically, we study the effect of the policy on market structure as
the industry evolves from a state with only “traditional” gasoline stations, to a state with both
traditional stations and a new set of potential entrants: large capacity stations with automated
self-service technologies. Since we think of the governmental intervention as occurring after the
technology innovations took place, we focus on comparing the “post reorganization” state of the
market with and without a price floor.
To capture the features of the retail gasoline industry we consider a market in which two types
of horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices. The first type of firm only has access to the
traditional “small” technology, characterized by a cost function cs(q) = csq + Fs. The second type
has access to both a “large” and a “small” technology. The large technology is characterized by a
low constant marginal cost and high fixed cost (i.e. cl < cs and Fl > Fs). The assumption that large
volume stores represent the more efficient technology is supported by the data, since the marginal
cost of selling gasoline is decreasing in the number of pumps (see Houde (2012)).
This results in a simultaneous game of complete information, in which the sets of available
actions for both types of firms are summarized by {A1,A2} = {(0, s), (0, s, l)}, where 0, s, and l are
out, small, and large respectively. There are six possible market structures denoted by ω: (0,0),
(0, s), (0, l), (s,0), (s, s), and (s, l). The first element of ω refers to the choice of the type 1 firm, and
the second to the choice of the type 2 firm. In the appendix we present a numerical example in
which we derive the outcomes predicted in the model developed in this section. For completeness,
in the example we allow both firms to have access to both technologies.
Pricing in our model is not predatory in the sense that firms are pricing below cost; however,
since the l technology has lower marginal cost but offers the same product quality as the s technol-
ogy, when both types compete in equilibrium the most efficient stores will post the lowest prices.
9Virginia Senate Bill No. 458, “Below-Cost Sales of Motor Fuel”, http://www.ftc.gov/be/V020011.shtm; and North
Carolina House Bill 1203 / Senate Bill 787 (proposed amendments to North Carolina’s Motor Fuel Marketing Act),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/ncclsenatorclodfelter.pdf.
10The statute in question was s.100.30. See
http://www.datcp.state.wi.us/trade/business/unfair-comp/unfair sales act.jsp.
11See http://www.cb-bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/00892.html.
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Depending on its fixed costs, the firm with the s technology may therefore prefer to stay out of
the market rather than enter and compete against the l technology. If the s-type firm stays out of
the market, the entrant is free to act as a monopolist. The purpose of the model is to investigate
whether a price floor can prevent this outcome, and lead to a market structure in which the small
technology is present and competition is enhanced.
Before firms commit to their technology and entry decisions, a regulator imposes a price floor
constraint pf . We assume that the floor is always set such that cs < pf < pml , where p
m
l is the
monopoly price for the large technology. In other words, we assume that the floor potentially
affects the equilibrium pricing game only in oligopoly markets. IfDj(p1, p2|ω) denotes the demand
of a firm of type j in market structure ω, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is characterized by the
following Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions:
Dj (p1, p2|ω)) + ∂Dj(p1, p2|ω)
∂pj
(pj − cj) + λj = 0 (1)
λj (pj − pf ) = 0, (2)
for each j ∈ {1,2} and λj ≥ 0. Since when both types compete we have pl ≤ ps, the price floor will
generate three possible outcomes: (i) neither price is constrained (λ2 = λ1 = 0), (ii) both prices are
constrained (ps = pl = pf ), or (iii) only the large firm is constrained (λ1 = 0 and pl = pf ).
We consider two types of long-run distortions affecting the equilibrium market structure. In
the first case, the floor binds in all oligopoly markets and induces excessive crowding, relative to
the unconstrained situation. In the second case, the price floor distorts the market by blocking the
entry of the most efficient firm.
Case 1: Excessive crowding
Consider an example in which the price floor is high and binds even in the (s, s) market structure.
Since firms are symmetric, their profits in the unconstrained and constrained cases are given by:12
piuj (s, s)− Fs = Dj(pus , pus )(pus − cs)− Fs
picj(s, s)− Fs = Dj(pf , pf )(pf − cs)− Fs, ∀j = {1,2}.
Notice that unless aggregate demand elasticity is very high, the constrained profits are increasing
in pf even for a reasonably large floor level. This is a reasonable assumption in gasoline retail
markets, since store-level elasticity is large, but aggregate demand is inelastic. In this range, the
presence of the price floor can increase profits sufficiently to justify staying active with the small
technology. In particular, the regulated market will be more crowded after the policy change if Fs
12We use superscripts c and u to indicate that the market is regulated and unregulated respectively.
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is in the following range:
Dj(p
u
s , p
u
s )(p
u
s − cs) < Fs < Dj(pf , pf )(pf − cs). (3)
As a result, in this case the policy attracts firms to the market. The equilibrium market structure
with the floor is (s, s) rather than (s,0) or (0, l) without. The floor will be binding and so prices
will increase or decrease relative to the unconstrained case depending on how high the floor is.
A similar result can be found in the real option literature, since a binding price floor provides a
form of insurance that allows more firms to enter and survive (see for instance Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)).
Case 2: Blockaded entry
There are two ways the policy can block the use of the more efficient technology. As in the first
example, the price floor can be set high enough such that it binds in all cases and makes the
selection of the large technology less profitable. For instance, consider the case in which (s, l) is an
equilibrium in the unregulated market:
piu1 (s, l)− Fs > 0, piu2 (s, l)− Fl > 0, and piu2 (s, l)− Fl > piu2 (s, s)− Fs,
where pi2(s, l) is the variable profit of the large firm in state (s, l), and pi1(s, l) is the variable profit
of type s.
When the price floor binds for both types, the type 1 firm is strictly better off and therefore s is
a dominant strategy in the regulated market. However, the type 2 firm might prefer to enter with
the small technology since the market is now split in half (i.e both firms charge pf ). In particular,
if the fixed-cost Fl is large relative to Fs, it is likely that the type 2 firm’s best-response to s is now
to opt for the small technology:
D2(pf , pf )(pf − cl)− Fl < D2(pf , pf )(pf − cs)− Fs.
In this example, the equilibrium under the price-floor regulation will therefore be (s, s) instead of
(s, l). The policy thus induces efficiency losses and yields higher prices by blockading the entry
with the large technology.
When the price floor is set to a lower level, it is possible that the regulation prevents the adop-
tion of the large technology, without raising prices. To see this, consider a situation in which
the selection of the large technology by the type 2 firm causes the type 1 firm to stay out in the
unregulated market:
piu1 (s, l)− Fs < 0 and piu2 (s, l)− Fl > 0.
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Assume further that the price-floor is low-enough and binds only for the large technology in
state (s, l). In this case, the regulation acts as a subsidy for the type 1 firm, and reduces the market
share of the large-technology firm. It is therefore possible for the regulator to set pf such that the
type 1 firm will revise its decision to stay out of the market:
piu1 (s, l)− Fs < 0 and pic1(s, l)− Fs > 0.
If this condition is satisfied, the policy prevents the least efficient firm from staying out. This in
turn can block the use of the large technology, provided that Fl is large enough. The equilibrium
under the price-floor is therefore (s,0) or (s, s) instead of (0, l). The equilibrium price in the reg-
ulated market can therefore be lower than the price in the unregulated market if the resulting
market structure is (s, s) and if the price in (s, s) is less than the price in (0, l). In this case the com-
petition enhancing effect of the policy will dominate the inefficiency losses present in the previous
example.13
Importantly, this last example shows that the policy can distort market structure without ac-
tually binding in equilibrium. As long as Fl is large enough, (0, l) will not be an equilibrium and
the price will be higher than the floor. That is, (s, s) or (s,0) will be the resulting equilibrium
depending on the parameters. This is important since the price floor in the retail gasoline market
in Que´bec is rarely observed to bind. The policy is unlikely to generate the first blockaded entry
case. Most of the time, the floor is set close to the wholesale price and so is not expected to bind
unless a low-cost retailer enters a very crowded area. For this reason we would also not expect to
observe the result from the excessive crowding case in Que´bec.
Finally, note that these results are not specific to the simple two-period model presented here.
In an online Appendix we show using numerical simulations that the two types of distortions
characterized in the simple model can be generated by a dynamic equilibrium model of entry and
product choice in which firms are infinitely lived.14 We use two parametric examples to show that
a price floor policy can prevent the exit of smaller firms and block entry of low-cost retailers. In
one example the policy clearly tends to raise prices because competition between efficient stores
in the unregulated market easily compensates for the larger number of firms in the regulated one.
In the other example, the price floor is almost never binding in equilibrium, but successfully keeps
the large stores out of the market and lowers prices.
One feature of the policy that is left out of the model is the fact that the floor can be dynamically
adjusted to compensate firms for price wars, to allow medium-size stations to recoup their fixed
costs. We did not add this feature to the model, but it very likely would exacerbate the third
13In a recent paper Asker and Bar-Isaak (2010) argue that minimum resale price maintenance policies can have exclu-
sionary effects by blocking the entry of more efficient manufacturers. Although the set-up is different, the mechanism
at work in their model is very similar to ours: minimum resale price maintenance can be used by incumbent manufac-
turers to increase retailer profits when they deter entry.
14The Appendix is available at http://www.jeanfrancoishoude.info/WordPress/.
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prediction, and create further crowding. Therefore, even it the lowest of the two floors is not
actually binding in equilibrium, the presence of a minimum margin raises the option value of
staying in the industry for small and medium size stations.
To summarize, according to our theory, a price-floor policy can distort the post reorganization
equilibrium structure of retail markets in two ways: excessive crowding, and blockaded entry.15
Two testable implications follow:
H1. The fraction of stations with the newer technology is smaller in markets subjected to a price
floor.
H2. The number of competitors is larger in markets subjected to a price floor.
Together these predictions yield the following corollary:
C1. The average volume per station is lower in markets subjected to a price floor.
This third prediction is the result of both selection and composition effects: a greater fraction of
“small” technology stations leads to lower volume per station, and increased competition reduces
the market share of each station.
The effect of the policy on prices is unclear. Prices can increase in the long run following the
introduction of a floor if it is frequently binding or if it keeps firms with higher marginal costs
active. On the other hand, if the competition enhancing effect of the policy is important and the
marginal cost difference between type l and s stations is small, prices can be lower in the long-run.
We test these predictions of the model in the following section of the paper.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Estimation strategy
The objective of our empirical analysis is to test the predictions of our theory by studying the im-
pact of Que´bec’s policy on long-run market structure and stations’ outcomes. Since price-control
policies are not put in place randomly, and we do not observe the evolution of a mirror image of
the Que´bec market without the policy, we follow a quasi-experimental approach, and compare
local markets in Que´bec with markets in comparable cities in the rest of Canada where similar
policies were not put in place. Furthermore, rather than comparing the post-policy steady-states
in treated and control markets, we use a difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect of
the policy on the changes in the structure of markets and stations’ outcomes. This eliminates part
of the endogenous selection problem by controlling for time-invariant market structure character-
istics that might have led to the regulation of the the Que´bec markets.
15Note that pre reorganization, the floor would have no effect on the equilibrium structure, which would be (s, s)
regardless of the floor since the l technology is not available.
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Moreover, since we are interested in long-run changes, we study the evolution of control and
treated markets over an eleven year period, between 1991 and 2001. During this period, the North
American gasoline industry underwent major changes that satisfy the two conditions required
for the policy to possibly distort markets: (i) newer stations exhibit larger capacity which yields
larger volume discounts, and (ii) newer stations require fewer labor inputs due to automatized
services. However, it remains an empirical question whether or not these technological changes
were important enough and the price floor policy implemented at the right time and the right
level to affect entry/exit and investment decisions.
We consider two main econometric specifications. First, we use the full panel to measure the
(potentially) differential evolution of markets and stations in Que´bec after the implementation
of the policy in 1997, relative to other markets in the rest of Canada. Second, we estimate the
effect of the policy on the changes in market and station characteristics between the two end points
of our panel: 1991 and 2001. These two years approximate the pre- and post-policy industry
steady-states. In this specification, we control for trends in other relevant variables before and
around the time of the implementation of the policy, which could be confounded with the policy
implementation.
We label the first specification full-panel, since it uses the information contained in the full,
yearly transition of markets from one steady-state to the other. We label the second specification
long-difference, since it focuses solely on the long-run changes in markets. The long-difference
specification uses less information than the full-panel specification, but is more in line with the
model implications, which refer to the long-run equilibrium outcomes before and after market
reorganization.
We estimate the long-difference specifications using both OLS and matching estimators (de-
scribed in detail below). The policy effect is identified from differences in the long-term trends
over the full decade. Note however that like in the full-panel fixed-effect specification, the esti-
mation focuses on changes initiated from 1997 onward since we control for pre-policy changes in
local market structure and demographics.
This section has five parts. In section 4.2 we provide a description of the data. In section 4.3
we discuss in detail the treatment and control groups on which our empirical analysis is based.
In section 4.4 we provide descriptive evidence of the reorganization of the gasoline industry in
Que´bec and in the rest of Canada consistent with the presence of market distortions. Sections
4.5 and 4.6 contain the center-piece of our analysis in which we use econometric techniques to
compare the markets and stations in Que´bec with control markets and stations, before and after
the policy was implemented, controlling for the observed and unobserved factors that may have
driven the observed changes. Finally, in section 4.7 we investigate the effect of the policy on prices.
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4.2 Description of the data
The gasoline station data used in this study were collected by Kent Marketing, the leading survey
company for the Canadian gasoline market. The survey offers accurate measures of sales and
station characteristics, since each site is physically visited at the end of each quarter. Volume sold
over the quarter is measured by reading the pumps’ meters. Station characteristics at that point in
time are recorded, as is the price posted on the date of the survey. The panel spans eleven years
between 1991 and 2001, and includes all 1601 stations in fourteen selected cities of Que´bec and
three other Canadian provinces. For our analysis we take the sales volume data collected at the
end of the third quarter of each year, along with the prices and station characteristics at this date.
The observed station characteristics include the type of convenience store, a car-repair shop
indicator, the number and size of the service islands, the opening hours, the type of service, and
an indicator for the availability of a car-wash. Brand indicator variables are also added to the set
of characteristics to reflect the fact that consumers might view gasoline brands as having different
qualities. We also have detailed information about the geographic location of each station in the
sample.
The Kent data contain no information on wholesale prices and so in our analysis we use data
collected by the market research firm MJ Ervin to measure wholesale prices. MJ Ervin collects
prices directly from the wholesalers and we have access to the regular unleaded wholesale (Rack)
price. These data are at the company (marketer) level, and for most of the analysis we compute
either an average or a minimum wholesale price.16
Since there is important variation in gasoline prices over time, there is some concern that the
annual price data from Kent are inadequate. Therefore, we have also collected weekly retail price
data from MJ Ervin (in the same provinces, but for a different set of markets) to complement the
Kent data. We will use this supplementary data set in Section 4.6 to show that our price results are
robust to the use of these higher frequency data.
In our analysis, markets correspond to metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, since retail gasoline
markets are spatially differentiated and stations face competition from a set of local competitors,
we are also interested in quantifying the degree of competition more locally. For this we will
proceed in two ways. First, we construct a station-specific neighborhood, defined as a two-minute
driving distance radius around each active station.
Second, we also construct neighborhood boundaries that define a set of spatially homogeneous
locations. To do so we use a clustering algorithm that groups store locations according to two cri-
teria, related to the distance between stores and whether they share a common street. Given these
criteria, a neighborhood approximates an intersection or a major street segment.17 Importantly,
16Wholesale prices can often include station- or firm-level discounts which we do not observe.
17 A common way of specifying neighborhoods is to use existing definitions, for instance census-tracts or zip codes.
While these definitions typically allow researchers to get accurate measures of population characteristics, their bound-
aries are arbitrary and do not necessarily reflect competition between stores. Although we use these measures to define
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our definition is time-invariant since the set of possible locations is defined as all locations ever
active throughout our sample. We describe in greater detail our procedure in the Appendix.18 The
median neighborhood size is three stations per neighborhood in the whole sample, but some cities
are clearly more dense than others. For instance, in Hamilton (Ontario) the median neighborhood
size is five stations, while Chicoutimi (Que´bec) neighborhoods have a median size of two stations.
Overall, the algorithm constructs neighborhoods that are very comparable across all the regions,
since the size distributions are very similar.
Table 11 in the Appendix presents a set of descriptive statistics for some of the key variables
used in the analysis, for both the pre- and post-policy periods and in both the cities inside and
outside Que´bec (we will denote those outside Que´bec as Rest). The table shows, for instance,
that: (i) the number large stations with more than four service islands and the average number of
pumps both increased by about 20% in Que´bec and by more than 50% in the rest of the cities, (ii)
the number of neighboring competitors decreased by 17% in Que´bec and by 29% elsewhere. We
come back to a description of these trends below.
4.3 Comparability of markets and control variables
The fourteen Canadian cities we study include five cities in Que´bec, which are our treatment
cities. Our control cities, which were not subjected to the policy include seven cities in Ontario,
and one city in each of Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan. We will refer to our control cities as “Rest
of Canada,” despite the fact that they are located mostly in Ontario. We observe all stations in all
cities throughout the years 1991-2001.
We exclude from the sample the biggest metro areas of Toronto and Montreal. As shown in
Table 1, the selected metropolitan areas are all comparable in terms of size, population growth,
volume of gasoline sold per capita and growth of volume per capita. Furthermore, there is con-
siderable overlap in the set of major players active in each market. Each market has some subset of
six chains that are integrated with the refinery sector: Shell, Esso/Imperial Oil, Ultramar, Irving,
Sunoco, and Petro-Canada.
As indicated in subsection 4.1, we base our econometric analysis on two different specifica-
tions, based on the full panel and the long-run changes between 1991 and 2001, respectively. The
two specifications are based on different information and have slightly different sets of regressors.
We label the controls in our full-panel specifications Zj,t, where j is the cross-sectional component
markets, below in our market-level analysis we will use information at the forward sortation area (FSA) level to con-
struct demographic trends that we match with the markets we construct. The FSA is the first half of a postal code. This
unit of aggregation corresponds to about 4 to 6 census-tracts in urban areas (or between 10,000 and 40,000 households),
or one small town in more rural areas. The median population size per FSA is about 16,000. There are over 1,300 FSAs
in Canada, and over 850,000 postal codes.
18The size and composition of the neighborhoods is affected by the parameters used in the clustering algorithm.
We pick the bandwidth parameter in order to obtain average neighborhood sizes around 3 stations, and avoid having
neighborhoods bigger than 15 stations.
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Table 1: Market characteristics
Market names Population ∆ Population Volume per cap. ∆ Volume per cap.
(%) (litres/day) (%)
Cornwall (On) 45726 0.29 2.59 3.57
Guelph (On) 101163 1.67 2.31 -0.91
Hamilton (On) 483981 0.91 2.03 0.02
Kingston (On) 145090 1.10 2.10 1.25
St Catharines (On) 129144 0.41 2.22 3.37
Chicoutimi (Qc) 162410 -0.42 1.84 1.77
Drummondville (Qc) 64241 0.99 2.54 -0.38
Quebec (Qc) 512746 0.33 3.03 1.22
Sherbrooke (Qc) 138957 0.70 2.38 1.40
Trois-Rivieres (Qc) 140847 0.05 2.03 0.72
Halifax (NS) 352548 0.95 1.95 2.04
Saskatoon (Sk) 224014 0.74 2.15 2.08
Brantford (On) 89615 0.79 1.90 -1.33
Windsor (On) 233709 1.49 1.91 3.08
Population and Volume per capita are market (i.e. city) averages taken over the period 1991 − 2001. The change
variables are averages of year-to-year log-changes taken over the same period and expressed in percentage (× 100).
(market, neighborhood, station) and t is the time period, and use Wj to label the controls in our
long-difference specifications for each cross-sectional component j.
Full-panel control variables
We include in Zj,t variables that measure: (i) FSA-level demographic characteristics (average in-
come, population size and unemployment rate),19 (ii) characteristics of the regional upstream mar-
kets (i.e. rack price and number of companies at nearest terminal) and (iii) provincial taxes on
gasoline.20 In the full-panel specifications we will also control for year and location fixed-effects.
Furthermore, when studying neighborhood- and station-level outcomes, we include indicators
for the presence of both Ultramar and Sunoco within a 2-minute driving distance of each station,
before and after 1996, to control for two events that occurred near 1997 and affected a fraction
of stations in Que´bec and in the rest of Canada. First, in March 1996, Ultramar and Sunoco, two
of the largest firms in the Canadian petrol industry, announced their intentions to swap their
service stations in Que´bec and Ontario.21 Second, in a further attempt to increase its share of
19See footnote 17 for a definition of FSA.
20Tax differences between Que´bec and the other regions were more important from 1995 on since the Que´bec gov-
ernment decreased the consumption tax and increased the excise tax on gasoline.
21The transaction involved Ultramar acquiring 127 Sunoco stations in Que´bec, and in exchange Sunoco acquired 88
Ultramar sites in Ontario. At the time, Sunoco did not have a refinery in Que´bec and chose to concentrate its retail
activities in Ontario and Western Canada. Ultramar on the other hand adopted the strategy of increasing its dominance
in the Que´bec market, and distributing a larger fraction of its Saint-Romuald refinery’s production (near Que´bec City)
locally.
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the Que´bec retail market, in the summer of 1996 Ultramar instituted a low-price guarantee policy
(ValeurPlus or ValuePlus). Since Ultramar has a greater presence in Que´bec than elsewhere, we
might worry that any effects on prices and market structure that we attribute to the price floor
policy are actually the result of one of these events.22 The exact list of variables included varies
across specifications as a function of the unit of analysis (i.e. stations or local markets). Each
results table includes a detailed footnote describing the list of control variables.
Long-difference control variables
We include in Wj a set of market and station characteristics that measure pre-policy market and
station characteristics, as well as changes in local demographic characteristics. More specifically,
we control for the 1991 levels, as well as changes between 1991 and 1996 and between 1996 and
2001, in demographics characteristics of each FSA (i.e. employment, population and income). We
also control for the presence of Sunoco and Ultramar stations in a 2-minutes neighborhood around
each locations. Finally, we include in Wj the 1991 levels and changes between 1991-1995 in the
characteristics of local markets (i.e. local monopoly indicator, average number of pumps and
islands, and number of competitors).23 This last group of variables controls for location-specific
pre-policy observable trends in market structure, and ensures that the policy effect is not identified
from changes that were initiated before the policy was first announced in 1996. Notice that some
variables in Zj,t are excluded from Wj because they are collinear (or close to) with the Que´bec
indicator variable (i.e. treatment).24
We use the control variables inWj in two ways. First, we use them as explanatory variables in
our long-difference OLS regressions. Second, in order to control for systematic observable differ-
ences between control and treated markets we also useWj to estimate the probability that a station
or local market is located in the treated region, and estimate the policy effect via a difference-in-
22We are not aware of other events of similar importance to the Ultramar and Sunoco episodes that would have
affected differently the treatment or control provinces during our sample period. This is not to say that the markets are
completely identical, but rather that there were no other important events, such as mergers, that affected the wholesale
or retail gasoline markets in our sample markets during our sample period. Among the other observed differences,
the Atlantic Provinces in Canada experimented with various forms of price controls in the past, but the only city in
our data from this region is Halifax in Nova Scotia where prices were regulated (maximum retail and wholesale price)
until mid 1991 by the Public Utilities Commission. Our results are robust to omitting 1991, and also to omitting Halifax
altogether. Also, as mentioned above, the impetus to reconfigure stations came in part from environmental regulations
surrounding underground storage tanks (UST). Starting in 1991, the Canadian government imposed a common set of
restrictions on the type of UST that gasoline stations must use in order to reduce leakage hazards. As pointed out by
Eckert and Eckert (2008), provinces implemented this policy by setting up slightly different time-lines for the renovation
of non-compliant stations. Que´bec and Ontario, our main control province, imposed similar implementation deadlines
of 1998 and 1997 respectively. The last relevant deadlines in Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan were later: in 2003 and
2005 respectively. In the empirical analysis, we present the results of a long-difference analysis, in which we compare
changes between 1991 and 2001. This helps us avoid drawing conclusions from what happened in the markets around
1997-1998.
23We choose 1995 as the end date for these changes since this allows for the possibility that the arrival of the policy
was anticipated starting in 1996.
24This procedure excludes taxes and rack prices, since both variables do not vary sufficiently within province.
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difference matching estimator. In particular, for each station or local market j, we use a Logit
model to estimate the probability of belonging to the treatment group (i.e. Que´bec):
Pr[QCj = 1|Wj ] = Pr(Wj), (4)
where QCj is a dummy equal to one for markets or stations located in Que´bec.25
Comparability of treated and control locations
In Table 2 we show the validity of the matching approach, by measuring the treatment/control dif-
ferences in the pre-policy outcome variables: station-level sales volume and markup, neighborhood-
level market structure (monopoly indicator, number of competitors, average number of pumps,
number of service islands), and local-cluster market structure (minimum distance, monopoly in-
dicator, average number of pumps). We also compare FSA demographic characteristics across
treatment and control groups. For each variable, we measure differences in the 1991 levels, and
in the 1991-1995 changes. Columns (1) and (2) present unweighted averages of these differences.
Columns (3) and (4) report weighted average differences obtained from matching regressions in
which stations and markets are matched according to the estimated propensity scores. Each entry
corresponds to a nearest neighbor matching regression coefficient, testing the null hypothesis that
the difference between control and treatment groups is zero.26
The results reported in the unweighted columns illustrate that the two groups exhibit signif-
icant differences in initial market structure. In Que´bec, local markets exhibited more stations in
1991, and stations were smaller on average (both in terms of volume and pumps). We also ob-
serve a few statistically significant differences in the trends before the policy intervention: stations
in Que´bec grew at a slower rate, and increased their pump capacity at a faster rate. Most of these
differences shrink in size and become statistically insignificant when controlling for the propensity
score defined in equation 4. This means that the estimated propensity scores account for virtually
all the pre-policy differences between treated and untreated markets and stations. The only out-
come to exhibit a significant (but small) difference is the average markup level and change. This is
likely due to the spatial correlation that exists in prices within regions, which biases downwards
the standard errors.
4.4 Industry reorganization and the policy
The reorganization of the industry was evident in both treated and untreated markets. The num-
ber of stations in the selected markets decreased by about 35% across the sample. Over the eleven
25The matching estimation procedure is described in detail in footnote 27.
26We use the four nearest neighbors to compute this average (i.e N = 4). The properties of the nearest neighbor
matching estimator are described by Abadie and Imbens (2006) and are incorporated into the STATA command nnmatch
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Table 2: Differences between treated and untreated markets and stations
VARIABLES Mean differences: QC - ROC Weighted differences: QC - ROC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Levels (’91) Changes (’95-’91) Levels (’91) Changes (’95-’91)
(1) Station volume -2,246.462a -910.122a -171.179 -130.635
(2) Station markup 0.128a -0.088a 0.038a -0.039a
Local nbh. (200 meters):
(3) Min. Distance -0.067b -0.014 -0.026 -0.012
(4) Mono. -0.045b -0.047a 0.010 -0.024
(5) Avg. Pumps -0.992a 0.500a 0.134 0.004
Cluster locations:
(6) Mono. -0.013 -0.045 0.081 0.033
(7) Nb. Comp. 0.260 0.159c -0.293 0.133
(8) Nb. Pumps -1.634a 0.374c 1.663 -0.143
(9) Islands -0.294a 0.036 0.082 0.029
FSA Demographics:
(10) Population -3,882.280a 535.186 -598.858 242.406
(11) Income -4,550.704a -3,635.918a 90.781 -857.514
(12) UR 0.803a 1.571a -0.106 0.370
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Columns (1) and (2) show the differences in the mean level and mean 1995-
1991 change for each variable between the markets and stations in Que´bec and the Rest of Canada. Columns (3) and (4)
show the differences in the mean level and mean 1995-1991 change for each variable between the markets and stations
in Que´bec and the Rest of Canada, conditional on the estimated propensity score.
Rows (1)-(5) correspond to station level variables: (1) daily sales volume (in liters), (2) price markup per liter (in
cents), (3) driving distance to closest station (in minutes), (4) no competitor within a 2-minute driving distance, (5)
average number of pumps of stations within a 2-minute driving distance. Rows (6)-(12) correspond to neighborhood-
level variables, where each neighborhood corresponds to one cluster as explained in the Appendix as follows: (6)
monopoly indicator, (7) number of competitors, (8) average number of pumps, (9) average number of islands, (10)
postal code-level population, (11) postal code-level average income and (12) postal code-level unemployment rate.
The conditional means were obtained from a matching regression of each variable on the estimated propensity scores.
The conditional means in rows (1)-(5) are obtained from station level regressions, whereas conditional means in rows
(6)-(12) are obtained from neighborhood-level regressions. For each matching regression standard errors are robust to
heterosckedasticity, and we use the bias correction method of Imbens et al. (Stata Journal 2004).
The propensity scores for the station-level regressions in rows (1)-(5) are estimated using a linear Logit specification
with the following controls: postal-code area demographics (population, income and unemployment rate) in 1991,
1996 and 2001 and changes between 1991-1996 and 1996-2001; neighborhood-level market structure in 1991 (monopoly
dummy, number of competitors, average number of pumps and islands); indicator variables for Ultramar and Sunoco
within 2 minutes driving distances in 1991; changes for all the station-level outcomes between 1991 and 1995.
The propensity scores for the neighborhood-level regressions in rows (6)-(12) are estimated using a linear Logit spec-
ification with the following controls: postal-code area demographics (population, income and unemployment rate)
in 1991, 1996 and 2001 and changes between 1991-1996 and 1996-2001; neighborhood-level market structure in 1991
(monopoly dummy, number of competitors, average number of pumps and islands); Ultramar and Sunoco presence in
1991; changes in the market structure variables between 1991 and 1995.
years of our panel, we observe a total of 229 new entrants and 670 exits out of 1,601 unique stations
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Table 3: Entrant, exiting, and continuing stations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Nb. Pumps Nb. Islands Large CS Self-service
Mean differences in the final year:
Entrant - Incumbent 1,125 1.234 0.1215 0.149a 0.052
(0.992) (0.138) (0.0466) (0.0472)
Exiting - Entrant 713 -7.284a -0.907a -0.466a -0.327a
(0.958) (0.135) (0.0461) (0.0478)
Exiting - Incumbent 1,588 -6.050a -0.782a -0.317a -0.275a
(0.333) (0.0609) (0.0211) (0.0235)
Policy effects by category:
New entrants 147 -9.161a -1.162b -0.462b -0.221
(3.035) (0.459) (0.183) (0.159)
Exiting 588 0.0974 0.140 -0.0656 0.0493
(0.854) (0.190) (0.0730) (0.0837)
Reconfiguring 456 -4.496b -0.445 -0.100 -0.112
(1.796) (0.278) (0.0961) (0.0957)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
The policy effects by category are estimated with difference-in-difference OLS regressions of each variable among
the stations in each category, across regions before and after the policy. Reconfiguring stations are stations that show a
change in the number of pumps larger than 4 at any point throughout the sample. In the top panel, entrants are defined
as stations that enter and never exit.
in fourteen cities. The large number of exits relative to entrants is easily explained by the fact that
the new “technology” corresponds to a larger capacity and requires more expensive equipment.
The upper panel in Table 3 illustrates the reorganization of all markets by comparing the char-
acteristics of new and exiting stations with each other and with the rest of stations. The first row
clearly shows that entrants and continuing firms have more or less the same size, but that entrants
are slightly more likely to have a convenience store and less likely to offer full service. Exiting
firms, however, are significantly smaller: on average, stations that exited before 2001 had 6 or 7
fewer pumps and less service-islands than entrants and continuing firms. Similarly, exiting firms
were much more likely to offer full-service and not have a convenience store attached to it. The
proportion of stations with a convenience store, and the proportion of self-service stations have
each increased by more than 20% in all regions.
Although all of the markets that we study experienced similar aggregate reorganization trends,
the rate at which these changes occurred differed in Que´bec and the other provinces. To illustrate
the impact of the policy on these changes, we estimate a series of difference-in-difference regres-
sions on three subsamples: entrants (entry date between 1992-2001), exiting (last year of activity
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between 1991 and 2000), and reconfiguring stations (discrete change in number of pumps between
1992-2001). For each station in these three groups, we measure the amenities and size at the time
of the change. That is, we measure its characteristics on the first year after entry occurs or after
a reconfiguration, or its characteristics the last year before exit occurred. When a station leaves
the market for a year before re-entering after renovations are completed, we code it as a recon-
figuration, rather than an exit followed by a new entry. We then estimate the following linear
regression:
Yj = βPolicyj + µ
year
t + µ
market
m + uj , (5)
where Policyj = QCj × 1(Ej ≥ 1997), Ej corresponds to the date of the three dynamic events
(i.e. entry year, exit year, reconfiguring year), Yj labels one of four outcomes (number of pumps,
number of islands, large convenience-store indicator, and self-service indicator), and µyeart and
µmarketm are year and market fixed effects.
The lower panel in Table 3 shows estimates of the policy on two measures of size and on
amenities. The results show that entering stations were significantly smaller in Que´bec in terms of
number of pumps and number of service islands, and were less likely to open a store with a large
convenience store. We estimate somewhat smaller but significant effects on the reconfiguration
decisions of incumbent stations. However, we fail to find any significant differences in the size or
amenities of exiting stations. These results suggest that the policy affected the reorganization of
the industry in Que´bec by reducing the incentive of large scale stations to enter the market, and to
a lesser extent by reducing the importance of incumbents’ investments in capacity. We come back
to this discussion in Section 4.6 when we study the impact of the policy on station outcomes.
4.5 Evidence of the impact of the policy on market structure
In this section, we present an econometric analysis of the change in market structure in Que´bec
and elsewhere before and after the implementation of the policy, controlling for observed and
unobserved variables that might be correlated with it. This section directly tests predictions H1
and H2.
Our analysis focuses on measures of competition, spatial differentiation, station capacity and
amenities. The outcome variables that we study differ based on the unit of analysis: (i) market
(cities as defined by the MSA metro areas), (ii) neighborhood (or clusters), and (iii) stations. At the
city level, we use two measures of concentration (HHI-index and number of stations), a measure
of the average minimum distance between stations, and two measures of average station sizes
(i.e.fraction of stations with more than 2 service islands). At the neighborhood (or cluster) level,
we construct measures of competition (e.g. number of competitors, and local monopoly indica-
tor), and calculate the average size and the fraction of active stations with certain amenities (e.g.
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Table 4: Market-level market-structure regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Distance HHI Stations % Large
min. per cap. (log) stations
A: Full-panel (ols)
Policy -0.037b -130.785a 0.089b -0.060b
(0.02) (34.56) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 154 154 154 154
B: Long-difference (ols)
Policy -0.049 -247.345 0.161b -0.099b
(0.03) (138.52) (0.06) (0.03)
Observations 14 14 14 14
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Standard-errors are clustered at the market level. Specifications in panel A
include the following controls: city population, city unemployment rate, number of companies at nearest terminal, rack
price, fraction of locations with Ultramar and Sunoco in 2 minutes neighborhoods (plus interaction with “after 1996”
indicator), year and market fixed effects. Panel B includes the following controls: change in city population, change in
unemployment rate, change in region-specific rack price, change in number of upstream companies at nearest terminal.
The Policy coefficients correspond to the long-run effect of the price-floor: Year ≥ 1997×Quebec.
more than two islands, convenience store, electronic payment). Finally, at the station level we
measure the distance between the nearest neighbor, the average size of stations located within a
two minutes driving buffer zone, and an indicator variable for local monopolies (also within a two
minutes driving distance). Notice that we define neighborhoods and choose the distance radius in
a way that would approximate “homogenous” locations, and therefore measures of competition
at this level also evaluate the extent of spatial differentiation.
Market-level regressions
We start by estimating the effect of the policy on the structure of markets at the market-level. We
use two types of samples: (i) the full panel between 1991 and 2001, and (ii) the long-difference
between 1991 and 2001. This leads to two difference-in-difference models for each outcome Y :
Yj,t = βFPolicyj,t +Zj,tγF + µ
market
j + µ
year
t + ej,t, (6)
∆Yj = βDQCj +WjγD + uj , (7)
where j indexes a market (i.e. MSA), Yj,t is the variable of interest and ∆Yj = Yj,2001− Yj,1991 is its
change between 1991 and 2001. The term Policyj,t = QCj × 1(t ≥ 1997) is a policy indicator.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the policy effects βF and βD for the full and long-
difference specifications respectively. Panel A corresponds to the full-panel specification, and
panel B corresponds to the long-difference specification. The estimates support the two theory
predictions. We find that regulated cities became relatively less concentrated and more crowded
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after 1997. The effects of the policy on the HHI and the number of stations per capita are sizeable.
We estimate that the policy led to a 130 point decrease in the level of the HHI, and an 8.9% increase
in the number of stations per capita (16.1% in panel B). Note that, on average, the market-level HHI
was 301 in Que´bec after the introduction of the policy. The fraction of stations with more than two
service islands (i.e. large stations) also decreased significantly due to the policy. The full-panel
specification implies a 6% decline, while the long-difference specification implies a 10% decline.
Compared with panel A, the estimates using the long-difference sample lose some precision
due to the fact that we have only 14 observations. The sign and magnitude of the implied policy
impact are similar in the two samples, implying that the timing of the policy coincided with the
changes estimated via the long-difference specification.
Neighborhood-level regressions
We now examine the effect of the policy at the neighborhood level in order to account for the fact
that competition in retail gasoline markets is localized. Recall that neighborhoods are constructed
using a clustering procedure that calculates non-overlapping areas with homogenous locations.
Before turning to the regression results, we first present the evolution of two neighborhood
characteristics over the sample period. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the fraction of local
monopolies and the average number of pumps in the Que´bec and control markets neighborhoods.
The initial levels of both variables are different across the treatment and control groups: Que´bec
neighborhoods initially had fewer local monopolies, and stations with fewer pumps. See the
summary statistics in Table 11. To control for these initial differences, we express each variable
in difference relative to their respective 1991 levels. The figures therefore show the change in the
fraction of local monopolies and average station size relative to 1991.
The vertical line in each panel indicates the moment at which the policy was introduced. Both
figures show that the reorganization of the industry during the 1990’s was less pronounced in
Que´bec than in the rest of Canada. Graph (a) shows that the gap between Que´bec and the con-
trol markets has been widening over time. Similarly, graph (b) shows that the difference in the
average size of stations has been increasing after the imposition of the policy in 1997. Therefore,
while the the prevalence of large stations increased everywhere, the increase was substantially
larger outside Que´bec. In both cases, the figures highlight that the implementation of the policy
coincided with changes in the trends in Que´bec relative to control markets. In the control markets
after 1997, firms entered and invested in larger-scale stations at a faster rate, consistently with the
end of the underground-storage tank regulation time-line. In contrast, we observe a slowdown
in investment and exit in the Que´bec neighborhoods, as illustrated by a slower increase in the
fraction of local monopolies and average station size.
To formally quantify the effect of the policy, we estimate a set of regression models controlling
for a rich set of observed covariates. As above, we consider two sub-samples: (i) the full panel
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Figure 2: Evolution of neighborhood market structure characteristics control markets between
1991 and 2001
between 1991 and 2001, and (ii) the long-difference between 1991 and 2001. This leads to two
difference-in-difference models for each outcome Y :
Yj,t = βFPolicyj,t +Zj,tγF + µ
nbh
j + µ
year
t + ej,t, (8)
∆Yj = βDQCj +WjγD + uj , (9)
where Yj,t is the variable of interest in neighborhood j in period t, and ∆Yj = Yj,2001− Yj,1991 is its
change between 1991 and 2001. The term Policyj,t = QCj × 1(t ≥ 1997) is a policy indicator, µnbhj
and µyeart are neighborhood and year fixed-effects.
We also estimate the long-difference specification using a nearest neighbor matching estima-
tor. We measure the distance between observations via an estimated propensity score defined in
equation 4. The propensity score measures the probability that a neighborhood j was subject to
the minimum price policy, conditional on the same controls variablesWj .27
27The estimation proceeds as follows: Denote by Q and Q− the set of treated and untreated markets respectively,
and let NQ and NQ− be the number of observations in each group. The estimated average treatment effect βˆD is
defined as the average difference between the observed long-difference in outcome Y in the treatment group, and the
counter-factual long-difference estimated using observed changes in “similar” markets from the control group (rest of
Canada):
βˆD =
1
NQ
∑
j∈Q
∆Yj − NQ−∑
i=1
wi,j∆Yi
 , (10)
where each treated observation j ∈ Q is matched with observations in the control group, each of which is weighted
according to wi,j . The nearest neighbor weights are equal to 1/N for the N observations in the control group that
are “closest” to observation j in the treatment group in terms of their propensity scores, and zero otherwise. In the
application, we use the four nearest neighbors to compute this average (i.e N = 4). For a detailed description of
difference-in-differences matching estimators see (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997). The properties of the nearest
neighbor matching estimator have been described by (Abadie and Imbens 2006) and are incorporated into the STATA
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Table 5: Local market-structure and amenities regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Competitors Monopoly Pumps Islands No CS Card
A: Full-panel with FE (ols)
Policy 0.111c -0.069b -0.940b -0.126b 0.055b -0.033c
(0.06) (0.03) (0.42) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 5,305 5,305 5,305 5,305 5,305 5,305
B: Long difference (ols)
Policy 0.008 -0.077c -1.986a -0.180c 0.030 -0.034
(0.07) (0.04) (0.67) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 437 437 437 437 437 437
C: Long difference (match)
Policy 0.182 -0.093 -2.628a -0.112 0.038 0.020
(0.16) (0.08) (0.82) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 337 337 337 337 337 337
Cross-sectional units: Non-overlapping neighborhood clusters.
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Standard-errors are clustered at the neighborhood level (except for panel
C). The sample includes “active” neighborhoods with at least one competitor. Each column represents a different re-
gression: (1) number of competitors, (2) monopoly indicator, (3) average number of pumps, (4) average number of
islands, (5) no convenience store, (6) card reader at the pump. Specifications in panel A include the following controls:
postal-code area demographics (population, income and unemployment rate), city population and unemployment rate,
number of companies at nearest terminal, rack price, indicator variables for Ultramar and Sunoco in 2 minutes neigh-
borhoods (plus interaction with “after 1996” indicator), short-run policy variables ((1996 ≤ Year ≤ 1997)×Quebec),
year and neighborhood fixed effects. The Policy coefficients correspond to the long-run effect of the price-floor:
Year ≥ 1997 × Quebec. Panels B and C include the following control variables: postal-code area demographics in
1991, 1996 and 2001 (and changes), 1991 neighborhood structure (monopoly dummy, number of competitors, average
number of pumps and islands), and Ultramar and Sunoco presence in 1991. The propensity score is estimated using a
linear Logit specification with additional controls for the change in all the outcomes between 1991 and 1995. For each
matching regression standard errors are robust to heterosckedasticity, and we use the bias correction method of Imbens
et al. (Stata Journal 2004).
Table 5 presents the estimated policy effects for six measures of competition and amenities,
and for the three econometric models. Each numbered column corresponds to a market structure
characteristic. Panel A contains the fixed effects regression based on the full sample with more
than 5000 market-year observations. Panels B and C show the results of the long difference es-
timation on the cross section of neighborhoods. Panel B presents results from OLS regressions,
while panel C presents the difference-in-difference matching regression results.
The results from the first two columns suggest that the policy led to more competitive local
markets, and less spatial differentiation. In column (1), the full sample estimation shows a sig-
nificant positive correlation of the policy with the number of competitors. The long difference
estimates are also positive, but are imprecise. In column (2), the OLS estimates in panels A and B
command nnmatch.
25
show that the fraction of local monopolies decreased by around 7% after the policy; the matching
estimate is qualitatively similar, but is imprecise.
The results from columns (3) and (4) show that the policy is associated with a decrease in the
size of stations, both in terms of pumps and in terms of service islands. In terms of number of
pumps, the estimated decrease is very robust across all specifications. The long-difference speci-
fications suggest a decrease by more than two pumps per station on average, compared to about
one pump in the first row. With the matching estimator we find a significant fall of about 2.6
pumps in the average size of stations. Recall that, on average, stations had 9.8 pumps in Que´bec
after the introduction of the policy. These findings suggest that the changes in Que´bec (relative to
the rest of Canada) were initiated before the policy, possibly because the policy was anticipated.
In columns (5) and (6) we estimate the effect of the policy on two amenities that we associate
with the technological change: the presence of a convenience store and automated payment. In
the full sample, the fraction of stations with these amenities increased at a significantly faster rate
in the rest of Canada, suggesting that stations in Que´bec were less likely to invest in new technolo-
gies. The long-difference OLS estimates have the same signs, but are statistically insignificant.
Overall, the long-difference results, both OLS and matching, are qualitatively similar to the
full-panel OLS results, but less precise, which should not be surprising given the much smaller
number of observations, and the relatively larger number of controls used to estimate the propen-
sity score functions.
Station-level regressions
We next examine the effect of the policy on the structure of local market structure, defined as a
2-minute driving distance buffer around each station. This leads to two regression specifications
estimated at the station-level:
Yj,t = βFPolicyj,t +Zj,tγF + µ
station
j + µ
year
t + ej,t, (11)
∆Yj = βDQCj +WjγD + uj , (12)
where Yj,t is the variable of interest for station j in period t, and ∆Yj = Yj,2001−Yj,1991 is its change
between 1991 and 2001. The term Policyj,t = QCj × 1(t ≥ 1997) is a policy indicator, µstationj and
µ
year
t are station and year fixed-effects.
In Table 6 we show estimates of the effect of the policy on the minimum distance between
stations, on the probability that an active station is a local monopoly (within two driving minutes),
and on the average size of nearby competitors (within two driving minutes). Panel A uses the full
year-stations panel data between 1991 and 2001 (13,228 observations), while panels B and C are
first-difference regressions between 2001 and 1991 (922 stations). Column (3) is estimated on the
sub-sample of stations with at least one competitor (i.e. 11,063 and 732 observations for panels A
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Table 6: Local competitors’ characteristics regressions
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Minimum driving Monopoly Avg. number of pumps
distance (min.) 2 min. driving 2 min. driving
A: Full-panel with FE (ols)
Policy -0.033c -0.069a -0.840a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.23)
Observations 13,228 13,228 11,063
B: Long-difference (ols)
Policy -0.039c -0.045c -1.446a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.33)
Observations 922 922 732
C: Long-difference (matching)
Policy -0.070b -0.073c -1.462a
(0.03) (0.04) (0.47)
Observations 922 922 732
Cross-sectional units: Stations
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Standard-errors are clustered at the station level. Each column corresponds
to a different regression: (1) minimum driving distance between stations (minutes), (2) no competitor within 2 minutes,
(3) average number of pumps within 2 minutes. Specifications in panel A include the following controls: postal-code
area demographics (population, income and unemployment rate), city population and unemployment rate, number
of companies at nearest terminal, rack price, indicator variables for Ultramar and Sunoco in 2 minutes neighborhoods
(plus interaction with “after 1996” indicator), year and neighborhood fixed effects. The Policy coefficients correspond
to the long-run effect of the price-floor: Year ≥ 1997×Quebec. Panels B and C include the following control variables:
postal-code area demographics in 1991, 1996 and 2001 (and changes), 1991 neighborhood structure (monopoly dummy,
number of competitors, average number of pumps and islands), and Ultramar and Sunoco presence in 1991. The
propensity score is estimated using a linear Logit specification with additional controls for the change in all outcomes
between 1991 and 1995. For each matching regression standard errors are robust to heterosckedasticity, and we use the
bias correction method of Imbens et al. (Stata Journal 2004).
and B/C respectively).
The policy effects estimated in Table 6 are statistically significant, and provide further evidence
that the minimum price policy distorted the structure of local markets. The results imply that
active stations in the rest of Canada became increasingly isolated compared to those in Que´bec.
This effect is clearer when looking at the fraction of stations with no immediate neighbor within
two minutes driving distance. All three specifications clearly show that this fraction decreased
by about 8% because of the introduction of the policy. As a result, the average distance between
stores also decreased in Que´bec relative to the rest of Canada.
The results regarding the size of stations are also consistent with the ones found previously
using our alternative definition of competitive neighborhoods. The average number of pumps
among nearby stations decreased by about one pump in Que´bec following the policy introduction.
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The results obtained with our matching difference-in-difference estimator are signficant and very
similar to the ones obtained with OLS.
4.6 Evidence of the impact of the policy on station performance
As we discussed in Section 4.4, the reorganization that took place in the industry induced sig-
nificant changes to the number and type of stations. In this section, we document how these
changes also led to large productivity gains across all markets, and particularly in markets out-
side of Que´bec. Table 7 illustrates this point by measuring the growth in volume per station in
the treated and control markets between 1991 and 2001. In the first three columns we calculate
a growth rate over the 11 year period equal to 105% in the rest of Canada, compared to 58% in
Que´bec. Much of the growth in productivity is associated with a 40% and 30% reduction in the
number of stations in the rest of Canada and in Que´bec respectively, with most of the exiting
stations being low-volume stations. Indeed, in the rest of Canada, stations that entered between
1992 and 2001 had sales’ volumes that were on average 280% larger than those of stations that
exited the market before 2001. The same statistic in Que´bec is 161%. Similarly, the growth rate of
incumbent stations in Que´bec is equal to 32%, compared to 54% in Ontario.
In the last three columns, we decompose the growth in each market into the contribution of
incumbents, entering and exiting stations respectively. To do so, we follow the strategy proposed
by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), and decompose the observed increase in the average
volume per station into a within-station growth component, reallocation between incumbents,
and relative size entering and exiting stations. In our context, the decomposition for region m is
given by:
∆Qm =
∑
s∈Cm
qs,2001 − qs,1991
Nm,1991
+
∑
s∈Cm
(
1
Nm,2001
− 1
Nm,1991
)
(qs,2001 − q¯1991)
+
∑
s∈Cm
(
1
Nm,2001
− 1
Nm,1991
)
(qs,2001 − qs,1991) (13)
+
∑
s∈Em
qs,2001 − q¯1991
Nm,2001
−
∑
s∈Xm
qs,1991 − q¯1991
Nm,1999
where qs,t is the volume of station s in period t, q¯t is the average station-level volume in period t,
Cm denotes continuing stations, Em denotes entering stations, andXm denotes exiting stations. In
Table 7 we identify the contribution of incumbents as the sum of the first three terms (i.e. within
and between firm growth terms, and the correlation term), and label the last two the contribution
of firms entering with the newer technology and of “traditional” stations exiting the market. The
result of this decomposition shows that the two groups of markets experienced a fairly similar
transition process. In Que´bec 65% of the growth is due to incumbents’ growth, and 35% to the
net entry of more productive stations. In the rest of Canada, the contribution of incumbent is
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Table 7: Decomposition of volume per station growth
Volume per station Growth decomposition
1991 2001 % Change Incumbents Entering Exiting
Que´bec 3,775.58 5,981.27 58% 1,438.45 360.16 -407.08
(608) (425) 65% 16% -18%
Incumbent 4,430.36 5,850.59 32%
(378) (378)
Exiting/Entering 2,699.46 7,032.32 161%
(230) (47)
Rest of Canada 5,371.90 11,013.21 105% 3,947.83 832.00 -861.49
(551) (328) 70% 15% -15%
Incumbent 6,986.45 10,737.39 54%
(294) (294)
Exiting/Entering 3,524.90 13,398.21 280%
(257) (34)
The index measures the share-weighted sales volume per day per station in liters. The Industry figure corresponds
to all stations in the region. Incumbent stations are stations that are present throughout the whole time span of the
sample. Entering stations are stations that entered after 1991 and exiting stations are stations that exited before 2001.
Numbers of stations in parentheses. The decomposition is done according to Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001).
We are interested in decomposing ∆Vt, where Vt =
∑
s∈I θstvst is the index of industry sales volume, θst is the share of
station s in industry I in period t and vst is an index of station-level sales volume.
larger at 70%. The difference between the two is mostly due to exiting firms, which contributed a
larger share of the growth in Que´bec (18% versus 15%). This is consistent with the fact that exiting
stations in Que´bec tended to be relatively smaller on average.
In order to quantify the effect of the policy on the volume of sales and prices of individual
stations, we estimate the effect of the policy using the full-panel and long-difference samples. In
the first three columns of Table 8 we test whether or not the policy affected stations’ sales volume,
and therefore can explain the differential growth in sales volume per station observed between
Que´bec and the rest of Canada. This corresponds to corollary C1: the distortions caused to market
structure by the policy should indirectly lead to lower sales per station. In theory, if demand is
inelastic, the policy should only affect the volume of stations through a reorganization effect; that
is through changes in the characteristics of active stations, and in the degree of competition from
neighboring stations.
However, in contrast to the market-structure regressions, here we are concerned about con-
trolling for the short-run impact on the policy on sales volume and markups. This is because the
year preceding the introduction of the policy exhibited severe price wars, and markups increased
by more than 10% immediately following the policy introduction. We estimate the following two
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econometric specifications:
Yj,t = β
lr
F Policyj,t1(t 6= 1996,1997) + βsrF Policyj,t1(t = 1996,1997) (14)
+Zj,tγF + µstationj + µ
year
t + ej,t,
∆Yj = βDQCj +WjγD + uj , (15)
where Yj,t is the variable of interest for station j in period t, and ∆Yj = Yj,2001−Yj,1991 is its change
between 1991 and 2001. The term Policyj,t = QCj × 1(t ≥ 1997) is a policy indicator, µstationj and
µ
year
t are station and year fixed-effects.
Panel A corresponds to linear difference-in-difference regression models estimated by OLS
with alternative controls. The volume regressions exclude observations with missing entries (10,933
observations). To control for the fact that volume is not measured for about 25% of stations, all
specifications in the table control for the selection probability (i.e. log and log squared). The selec-
tion probability is estimated with a Probit model, and controls for station characteristics (i.e. size,
amenities, and brands), and year/market dummy variables.
In column (1) we condition only on “exogenous controls”: market fixed-effects, demographics
characteristics, taxes, upstream market characteristics, and the presence of Sunoco and Ultramar
in a two-minutes neighborhood. In this specification, we estimate that the policy led to a sizable
decline in volume per station of nearly 1,500 liters per day. This estimate reflects both the selection
and composition effect. That is, the coefficient reflects the fact that lower productivity stations
remain active in Que´bec, and that incumbent stations exhibit different characteristics following
the government intervention.
In column (2), we isolate the composition effect of the policy by conditioning on station fixed-
effects. In this specification, the policy effect is identified solely from incumbent stations that
remain active for a least one year in the pre and post policy period. The estimated effect decreases
by about 500 liters, and implies that the composition effect alone corresponds to a 1000 liters
decrease in the average volume per day of stations in Que´bec.
In column (3), we further control for characteristics of stations, and measures of the structure
of neighborhoods and markets. The exact definitions of these “endogenous controls” are listed
in the footnote of Table 8. We use the dependent variables from our market-structure regressions
discussed in section 4.5 as right-hand-side variables, and use richer definitions of competitive
neighborhoods by combining more than one distance radii.
The results confirm the theory prediction: after conditioning on characteristics of stations and
local markets, stations in Que´bec did not decrease their productivity significantly following the
policy introduction. Therefore, although stations in Que´bec became relatively less productive
because of the policy, it is entirely due to a decrease in the average size of stations and an increase
in the competitiveness of the markets, relative to the rest of Canada.
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Table 8: Volume regressions
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Volume Volume Volume
A: Full panel
Policy (long run) -1,474a -1,012a -220.1
(359.6) (276.7) (271.2)
Policy (short run) 844.1a 590.5a 238.7
(225.0) (178.1) (158.9)
Observations 10,933 10,933 10,933
B: Long difference
Policy (OLS) -875.3b 12.73
(374.7) (365.0)
Policy (Matching) -884.0 106.0
(722.9) (610.6)
Observations 598 579
Control variables
Demographic controls X X X
Station FE X X
Stations+Neighborhoods controls X
Market controls X
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Standard-errors are clustered at the station level (for panel A). All specifica-
tions in panel A include the following demographic controls: postal-code area demographics (population, income and
unemployment rate), city population and unemployment rate, number of companies at nearest terminal, rack price,
indicator variables for Ultramar and Sunoco in 2 minutes neighborhoods (plus interaction with “after 1996” indicator),
short-run policy variables ((1996 ≤ Year ≤ 1997)×Quebec), year and station fixed effects. Specification (2) in Panel A
adds controls for station characteristics (pumps, islands, convenience store type (3), carwash, repair shop, conventional
type, self-service, major brand indicator), and neighboring station attributes using four neighborhood definitions: non-
overlapping clusters (see text), driving distance radiuses (2 and 5 minutes), and common streets indicator. Competing
stations’ attributes are: number of close competitors, number of pumps, number of service islands, fraction of major
brands. Specification (3) in Panel A adds market-level (city) market structure variables: number of stations per capita,
number of pumps and islands per capita, and the average number of pumps and islands per station (in log). Column (3)
in Panel B controls for station and market characteristics by using as dependent variable the residual of two regressions
of volume/markup on the demographics, stations, neighborhoods and city explanatory variables (i.e. same controls as
column (3) in panel A). The propensity score in the matching regressions is estimated using a linear Logit specification
with the following control variables: postal-code area demographics in 1991, 1996 and 2001 (and changes), 1991 neigh-
borhood structure (monopoly dummy, number of competitors, average number of pumps and islands), Ultramar and
Sunoco presence in 1991, and the change in volume and markup between 1991 and 1995. For each matching regression
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, and we use the bias correction method of Imbens et al. (Stata Journal
2004).
The short-run results in the second row of Table 8 also confirm our assumption that aggregate
gasoline demand is inelastic. After controlling for stations and market characteristics, we estimate
that volume per stations did not increase between 1996 and 1997 in Que´bec. In fact, sales volume
per station increased slightly over this period, but not statistically significantly so, despite a nearly
10% increase in markups.
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In Panel B, we estimate the long-run effect of the policy on sales volume using both OLS and
the same nearest-neighbor matching estimator described above. In particular, for stations that
were active in 1991 and 2001, we estimate the effect of the policy on the long-run change in vol-
ume. In the matching regression we compare stations in Que´bec with similar control stations,
according to the propensity score. The long-difference estimates shown in column (1) imply that
the policy had a negative effect of around 880 liters, ignoring the endogenous changes in market
and station characteristics. The matching estimate is statistically insignificant but still similar to
the OLS result.
In order to control for the fact that station and market characteristics changed over the same
period, we obtain estimates with controls for these changes. In order to estimate the matching
regression we project sales volume on our set of endogenous controls using the control sample
observations. The matching difference-in-difference estimator is therefore constructed using the
implied residual volumes, rather than the levels. This is an application of a regression-adjusted
matching estimator as described by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997). The estimates shown in
column (3) of panel B confirm the results obtained in Panel A: after conditioning on endogenous
controls, we estimate that the policy did not lead to any significant change in the average volume
per stations.
4.7 Evidence of the impact of the policy on prices
In light of the evidence presented so far on the effects of the policy on market structure, a natu-
rally related question is: do these market structure effects outweigh the efficiency gains from the
adoption of the new and superior technology in such a way as to have an impact on prices? In
this section we attempt to answer this question by testing the effect of the policy on prices. Recall
from Section 3 that our theoretical model’s predictions were ambiguous as to this: if the floor is
frequently binding or keeps high marginal-cost firms in the industry, then prices will increase; if
the floor increases competition, then prices will fall.
Table 9 shows the estimates of the same econometric specifications used in the volume regres-
sions. Since gasoline prices do not exhibit much dispersion within cities, we adjust the method
used to calculate standard-errors. Rather than clustering observations at the station-level, we cal-
culate standard-errors that are clustered at the city-year level.
The long-run results indicate large price declines of 3.0 cents in Que´bec following the introduc-
tion of the policy. This effect falls somewhat when controlling for fixed station characteristics (i.e.
-2.8 cents), but it is still significantly different from zero. In column (3), we show that after condi-
tioning on the changes in the structure of gasoline markets, the policy did not lead to a significant
average price decrease. Therefore, in the full panel, controlling for the endogenous characteristics
of stations and markets reduces the estimated policy effect almost entirely.
The long-difference estimates presented in Panel B of Table 9 yield more ambiguous results.
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Table 9: Price regressions
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Price Price Price
A: Full panel
Policy (long run) -2.996a -2.803b -0.783
(1.116) (1.200) (1.500)
Policy (short run) 3.756a 3.632a 3.057b
(1.273) (1.364) (1.351)
Observations 13,227 13,227 13,227
B: Long difference
Policy (OLS) -1.259a -1.586a
(-0.206) (-0.188)
Policy (matching) -3.873a -0.948c
(-0.932) (-0.516)
Observations 922 922
Control Variables
Demographic controls X X X
Station FE X X
Stations+Neighborhoods controls X X
Market controls X
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Standard-errors are clustered at the city-year level (for panel A). All specifica-
tions in panel A include the following demographic controls: postal-code area demographics (population, income and
unemployment rate), city population and unemployment rate, number of companies at nearest terminal, rack price,
indicator variables for Ultramar and Sunoco in 2 minutes neighborhoods (plus interaction with “after 1996” indicator),
short-run policy variables ((1996 ≤ Year ≤ 1997)×Quebec), year and station fixed effects. Specification (2) in Panel A
adds controls for station characteristics (pumps, islands, convenience store type (3), carwash, repair shop, conventional
type, self-service, major brand indicator), and neighboring station attributes using four neighborhood definitions: non-
overlapping clusters (see text), driving distance radiuses (2 and 5 minutes), and common streets indicator. Competing
stations’ attributes are: number of close competitors, number of pumps, number of service islands, fraction of major
brands. Specification (3) in Panel A adds market-level (city) market structure variables: number of stations per capita,
number of pumps and islands per capita, and the average number of pumps and islands per station (in log). Column (3)
in Panel B controls for station and market characteristics by using as dependent variable the residual of two regressions
of volume/markup on the demographics, stations, neighborhoods and city explanatory variables (i.e. same controls as
column (3) in panel A). The propensity score in the matching regressions is estimated using a linear Logit specification
with the following control variables: postal-code area demographics in 1991, 1996 and 2001 (and changes), 1991 neigh-
borhood structure (monopoly dummy, number of competitors, average number of pumps and islands), Ultramar and
Sunoco presence in 1991, and the change in volume and markup between 1991 and 1995. For each matching regression
standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, and we use the bias correction method of Imbens et al. (Stata Journal
2004).
The matching results are consistent with the full-panel results, and imply that once we control
for endogenous characteristics the policy effect drops significantly. In contrast, the OLS results
suggest that the changes in market structure and station characteristics failed to fully explain the
long-run decline in prices among stations that were active between 1991 and 2001. We find that,
not only do the effects not disappear after controlling for the endogenous changes in station and
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market characteristics. This means that the market structure changes that we estimate in this
specification are not sufficiently pronounced to explain the stark changes between 1991 and 2001.
In the full-panel specifications changes were distributed over the entire period, and the slower
reorganization in Que´bec can explain most of the observed decline in prices.
This lack of robustness across specifications is likely due to small amount of within-market
price variation. Since neighboring stations often post the same price, we are left with very little
cross-sectional variation to infer something about the effect of the policy on prices. Unfortunately,
this is the nature of competition in gasoline markets. The lack of cross-sectional variation makes
the results sensitive to the influence of market-level outlier observations. This likely explains the
differences among the two long-difference specifications, since the estimation relies on long-run
changes in prices among the cities (rather than 11 observations per city as in the full panel).
Our conclusions with respect to the impact of the policy on prices are also weak because of the
frequency of the price data. We observe station-level prices only once a year, and we are forced
to ignore the important week-to-week price variation. The existence of predictable asymmetric
cycles akin to Edgeworth cycles (Edgeworth (1925) in which price increases are both simultane-
ous and large (relenting phase), and are followed by a sequence of small decreases (undercut-
ting/matching phase) has been documented by Castanias and Johnson (1993) in U.S. markets,
and by Eckert (2002) and Noel (2007) in Canada. If cycles were shorter in Que´bec because of the
floor, then it would be more likely that a price at the bottom of the cycle would be sampled in
Que´bec than in other regions. Even though we estimate effects using average prices over a period
of three years, this could potentially explain the lower long-run prices we find in Que´bec.
To circumvent the lack of week-to-week variation in our main data set we collected weekly
city-level average prices between 1991 and 2001 from MJ Ervin. Over this time period, MJ Ervin
collected prices in 13 Canadian cities.28 All specifications use Montreal and Que´bec City as treat-
ment cities, since these are the only Que´bec cities in the data set. We consider three different sets
of control cities. The first uses Toronto, Regina and Halifax. This choice is motivated by our selec-
tion of markets in the Kent data. In the Kent data we have information on cities in four provinces:
Que´bec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan. We selected all available cities in the MJ data
that were in these provinces, with one exception: Ottawa. We drop Ottawa, since it is linked to
the Que´bec markets of Hull and Gatineau. The second set uses all 11 of the control cities. Finally,
the third set uses all of these except for Ottawa (for the reasons explained above) and Vancouver,
since it experienced an abnormally long price war in the late 1990’s triggered by the entry of a
big-box retailer, and since self-service stations were banned or restricted in at least one suburb of
the city.29
28The cities are Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Regina, Toronto, Ottawa, Halifax, Saint John, St Johns,
Charlottetown, Montreal and Que´bec City.
29See The Conference Board (2001) and http://www.coquitlam.ca/Libraries/Zoning Bylaw/Part 17 -
Service Station Zones.sflb.ashx.
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Table 10: Price difference-in-difference regressions using weekly price data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES (t≥1991) (t≥1992) (t≥1993) (t≥1994) (t≥1995)
Controls: Toronto, Halifax, Regina
Policy (LR) -3.273a -2.428a -2.177a -1.552a -1.489a
(0.830) (0.638) (0.529) (0.486) (0.514)
Policy (SR) -1.814b -0.972c -0.723 -0.0969 -0.0333
(0.785) (0.527) (0.449) (0.410) (0.451)
Observations 2,765 2,500 2,250 1,995 1,780
Controls: All cities
Policy (LR) -1.929b -1.093c -0.786 -0.206 -0.114
(0.753) (0.620) (0.630) (0.596) (0.666)
Policy (SR) -1.778a -0.943b -0.637 -0.0574 0.0343
(0.630) (0.450) (0.472) (0.446) (0.557)
Observations 6,636 6,000 5,400 4,788 4,272
Controls: All cities except Ottawa and Vancouver
Policy (LR) -2.862a -1.979a -1.656a -1.021c -0.928
(0.749) (0.609) (0.613) (0.565) (0.622)
Policy (SR) -2.230a -1.351a -1.030b -0.395 -0.303
(0.637) (0.451) (0.467) (0.414) (0.499)
Observations 5,530 5,000 4,500 3,990 3,560
Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Standard-errors are clustered at the city-year level. Results correspond to
OLS estimates of the effect of the policy on weekly prices. Exogenous controls in all regressions include the rack price,
and city and year fixed effects. In columns (2) through (5) we test the robustness of our results to the variation of the
start date of the “before” period in our analysis.
We also test the robustness of these results to the variation of the start date of the ’before’
period in our analysis. More precisely, using the weekly MJ Ervin data we re-estimate the price
regressions successively dropping the earliest years of data (first dropping 1991 and estimating
using 1992-2001, then dropping 1992 and estimating with 1993-2001, and so on). These results are
also presented in Table 10
To summarize, using our main data set, we find that two of three specifications suggest that
the majority of the price drop in Que´bec was due to endogenous market structure changes. The
weekly results provide mixed evidence that prices fell unconditionally of these changes. Recall
that the effect of the floor on price operates through three channels: (i) an increase in competition
(negative), (ii) a drop in efficiency and productivity (positive), and (iii) a positive probability of a
binding floor (positive). While our findings may not provide robust results, we believe that they
credibly establish that the two positive effects (efficiency and binding constraint) do not dominate
the negative force (competition). Every specification that we have considered yields a zero or
negative effect of the regulation on prices, and the point estimate is never positive. Given that
price-floor regulations are typically viewed as exerting upward pressure on prices, and that it is
reasonable to expect the efficiency effect to be important this result is, in itself, interesting. Our
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price results are also consistent with those of Skidmore, Peltier, and Alm (2005), who find that
prices tend to fall after the adoption of sales-below-cost laws in US gasoline markets.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the price floor regulation established in the Que´bec retail gasoline market has
had a substantial effect on market structure. We also showed that the policy caused distortions
to the sales of gasoline at individual stations. We identified these effects comparing the long-run
behavior (before and after 1997) in the local gasoline markets in Que´bec and other provinces where
the policy was never implemented.
We find that the policy significantly affected the reorganization of the markets. In Que´bec,
there were more stations after the policy was introduced compared to the rest of Canada, after
controlling for unobserved market and time-specific effects. Moreover, stations outside Que´bec
became bigger and offered a wider variety of products. After the policy was introduced, Que´bec
stations became relatively more homogeneous in terms of the type of services that they offered,
mostly because new stations entering in the rest of Canada were very different from the stations
that stayed in the market. Moreover, there is evidence that the policy caused a long-run decrease
in station-level sales, but that despite the observed increase in efficiency, prices did not rise.
These results are consistent with our interpretation of the effect of the price floor on market
structure. As we have shown in our theoretical model, even when it does not bind, the policy
can block the entry of more efficient firms that must incur larger operating costs and increase
competition. Sales and prices can therefore both be lower.
Moreover, our interpretation is in line with reports from impartial sources critical of Que´bec’s
price floor regulation that also suggest that the implementation of the floor slowed down the
rationalization relative to other North-American markets. In a 2002 report aimed at opposing a
proposed increase in the price floor, the Canadian Automobile Association (CAA) argued that
between 1997 and 2002 the price floor policy generated a productivity gap between stations in
Que´bec and those in Ontario and the US. This is evidence that industry analysts consider the floor
as the leading cause of Ontario’s faster rationalization.30
We have mentioned that there are other factors not considered in our static model that may
influence the reorganization of markets. In particular, there are other possible means by which the
price floor could negatively affect the profits that stations expect to earn upon entry in a repeated
game framework. For instance, it may be that the presence of a price floor makes it difficult for
firms engaged in tacit collusion (as in Porter (1983)) to revert to a “punishing” stage. By limiting
30The CAA is a consumer protection group present throughout all of Canada. In 1997, this organization was in
favor of the price floor regulation as a way to reduce the frequency of price wars. Their reports are available on
the Board’s website: http : //www.regie− energie.qc.ca/audiences/3499− 02/mainDocDepotAudience3499.htm and
http : //www.regie− energie.qc.ca/audiences/3499− 02/mainPreuv3499.htm
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the extent to which firms can punish defectors, Que´bec’s price floor may restrict the severity of
price wars. In doing so it may make pricing strategies less stable and make it increasingly difficult
to sustain this type of equilibrium. The expected reduction in profit may deter the entry of new
firms, as we observe in the data.31
However, the floor may actually serve as a facilitating device. It clearly provides a focal price
to coordinate price changes, and can facilitate communication because it permits firms to sue their
competitors if they charge low prices. Indeed, collusion has taken place in Que´bec since the arrival
of the floor. Stations in four cities in Que´bec were charged with price fixing in 2006.32 However,
collusion in Sherbrooke does not seem to have started until after our sample period as the market
experienced severe price wars in 1998 and 1999. The price wars are consistent with the market
being in excess capacity, and evidently help to explain some of our markup results. It may also
facilitate collusion when firms are asymmetric in terms of costs. The floor may allow high-cost
firms to punish low-cost firms when this would not be possible otherwise. The existence of the
floor means that punishment is at the floor rather than at some even lower price. So if the floor
is sufficiently low that reverting to it represents a punishment, but is high enough that it is above
the marginal cost of the high-cost firm, then it may in fact facilitate collusion.
There might also be additional effects of Ultramar’s low-price guarantee, beyond the effects
that we control for. In our empirical analysis we control for Ultramar’s low-price guarantee within
local markets, but it is possible that it had global effects that were not picked up by the controls.
Specifically, the concern is that the low-price guarantee, if credible, might in fact be responsible
for the entry distortion that we observe. New firms may be reluctant to enter the market with
the ”large” technology – low variable, but high fixed costs – since this technology demands that
firms set lower-prices than their competitors in order to grab market share. Ultramar’s low-price
guarantee might prevent entrants from selling enough volume to cover their fixed costs.
However, since this policy is essentially a price-matching guarantee, it may not actually deter
entry. Arbatskaya (2001) shows that with price-matching guarantees an incumbent cannot deter
entry into the market.33 Furthermore, Ultramar’s commitment to the low-price guarantee may
not be credible. Therefore, if new firms actually enter with the ”large” technology, Ultramar will
retreat from its guarantee. That is, should a sufficient number of ”large”-type entrants actually
enter the market, it may not actually be optimal for Ultramar to stick with its low-price guarantee.
What does our analysis say about welfare? The evidence presented here suggests that the pol-
icy decreased prices at the pump for consumers. On the other hand, after the policy, stations in
31See Gagne´, Van Norden, and Versaevel (2003) for a study of punishment under the Que´bec gasoline price regula-
tion.
32See Clark and Houde (2013a) and Clark and Houde (2013b) for detailed analyses of these cartels
33Entry occurs in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential move entry game and the incumbent is ac-
commodating. However, the price-matching guarantee is shown to be valuable for the incumbent as an incentives
management device. In any subgame perfect equilibrium the firms share the market equally and the price-matching
guarantee serves to facilitate collusion.
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Que´bec became increasingly different from stations in the other cities in the sample. Therefore, af-
ter the policy, consumers in the control markets were paying for different services than consumers
in Que´bec, in the sense that new stations in the controls were generally bigger and offered a wider
variety of products.
On the firms’ side, we find that after the policy stations in Que´bec were charging lower prices
and had lower sales. This increase in net revenue for stations outside Que´bec may reflect an in-
crease in rents due to decreased competition. On the other hand, the higher prices may just reflect
higher fixed or entry costs which reflect the expanded services they provide. From an environ-
mental perspective, if the policy kept older stations in the market, an indirect consequence is in-
creased risk of hazardous tank leakage. Evaluating all these welfare effects requires the structural
estimation of a precise market model, which is something we leave for future research.
Notice finally that our results are specific to Que´bec gasoline markets during a particular time
period. Even though extrapolation of our results to other markets is not possible, our findings pro-
vide evidence that such effects might be present in any market. As discussed in the Introduction,
similar price regulations are not uncommon. For example, agricultural price controls that provide
insurance to local producers against excessively low prices are a form of price floor. In Europe,
regulation aimed at protecting small retailers from the aggressive pricing of big retailers is com-
mon. And throughout the world, anti-dumping regulation aimed at protecting local producers by
forbidding foreign firms from setting price below average variable costs are a subtle form of price
floor. All these policies have longer run effects on market structure and performance that are not
always fully recognized.
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A Additional tables
Table 11: Summary statistics of the key variables for markets in Que´bec and the rest of Canada
before and after the policy change
Before 1997 After 1997 Diff-in-Diff
VARIABLES Quebec Rest Quebec Rest %
N Avg. (sd) N Avg. (sd) N Avg. (sd) N Avg. (sd)
Price 3873 29.48 3926 27.62 2739 34.12 2689 35.72 -0.118a
(3.082) (3.964) (6.815) (7.934)
Markup 3873 0.27 3926 0.19 2739 0.17 2689 0.17 -0.290a
(0.114) (0.120) (0.103) (0.073)
Sales vol (x1000 lt/day) 3495 4.29 3130 6.70 2447 5.73 1979 10.12 -0.483a
(2.971) (4.535) (4.043) (6.792)
Nb. of pumps 3873 8.14 3926 9.80 2739 9.85 2690 13.73 -0.270a
(5.723) (5.914) (7.307) (9.739)
Nb. Islands 3873 2.11 3926 2.42 2739 2.26 2690 2.77 -0.085a
(1.268) (1.275) (1.341) (1.453)
Islands > 4 3873 0.17 3926 0.20 2739 0.22 2690 0.30 -0.334a
(0.380) (0.396) (0.412) (0.457)
No Conv. store 3873 0.58 3926 0.59 2739 0.40 2690 0.36 0.079a
(0.494) (0.492) (0.490) (0.480)
Carwash 3873 0.19 3926 0.18 2739 0.19 2690 0.22 -0.221a
(0.392) (0.383) (0.390) (0.413)
Pay at the pump 3873 0.00 3926 0.02 2739 0.00 2690 0.02 0
(0.000) (0.124) (0.019) (0.140)
Repair shop 3873 0.19 3926 0.08 2739 0.16 2690 0.07 -0.142b
(0.393) (0.265) (0.362) (0.247)
Self service 3873 0.37 3926 0.31 2739 0.50 2690 0.40 0.131a
(0.482) (0.463) (0.500) (0.491)
Local comp. 3873 4.30 3926 4.18 2739 4.03 2690 3.43 0.113a
(0.459) (1.291) (0.893) (1.332)
Street comp. 3873 10.20 3926 13.36 2739 7.43 2690 11.58 -0.090a
(9.423) (15.677) (6.245) (13.575)
The policy effects by category are estimated with difference-in-difference OLS regressions of each variable among
the stations in each category, across regions before and after the policy. Significance level: a 0.01, b 0.05, c 0.1. Recon-
figuring stations are stations that show a change in the number of pumps larger than 4 at any point throughout the
sample. In the top panel, entrants are defined as stations that enter and never exit.
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B Numerical example of model
In this appendix we provide a numerical example in support of the claims made in the model of
entry and price competition presented above. That is, we show for a given demand characteriza-
tion and a given set of parameter values, that the outcomes described in the text can arise.
To show that our results are not driven by the asymmetric strategy sets of the two firms we
assume here that both firms have access to both the s and the l technologies. Therefore, sets of
available actions for both types of firms are summarized by {A1,A2} = {(0, s, l), (0, s, l)}.34
To characterize demand at each store, we use a logit model, and so when both firms are active,
demand for store j ∈ {1,2} is given by:
Dj(p1, p2|ω) = M e
(δj−pj)
eν +
∑
k e
(δk−pk) , (16)
where k is the set of firms that chose action s or l. Demand for firms choosing action 0 is assumed
to be zero.
Without a price floor constraint, a symmetric price equilibrium is described by two prices
p = {p1(ω), p2(ω)} solving the following FOCs:
Dj (p1, p2|ω))−M (pj(ω)− cj)sj (1− sj) = 0, j ∈ {s, l} (17)
where sj = e
(δj−pj)
eν+
∑
k e
(δk−pk)
. When firms are constrained by a price floor pf > 0 the equilibrium is
characterized by four Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
Dj (p)−M (pj(ω)− cj)sj (1− sj) + λj = 0 (18)
λj (pj(ω)− pf ) = 0 (19)
for each j ∈ {1,2} and λj ≥ 0.
In what follows we set M = 1000, normalize the value of the outside good (ν) to be zero, and
set δj = 1 for j = {1,2}. We also assume that cs = 0.2 and that cl = 0.
With these parameter values, the unconstrained game is as in Table 12.
Table 12: Unconstrained game
Player 2
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,497.7− Fs 0.0000,567.1− Fl
1 s 497.7− Fs,0.0 362.9− Fs,362.9− Fs 348.4− Fs,417.5− Fl
l 567.1− Fl,0.0 417.5− Fl,348.4− Fs 401.1− Fl,401.1− Fl
34If we think of one of the firms as being the incumbent, then the large technology would represent its reconfiguration.
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B.1 Excessive crowding
In the excessive crowding case we assume that the price floor is high and binds even in the (s, s)
market structure. So we assume that pf > 1.563 which is the Nash equilibrium price in the (s, s)
outcome of the unconstrained game. We set Fs = 360 and we suppose that Fl = 413. Then the
constrained and unconstrained games can be seen in Table 13.
Table 13: Excessive Crowding
Unconstrained game
Player 2
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,137.7 0.0,153.8
1 s 137.7,0.0 2.9,2.9 −11.6,3.0
l 153.8,0.0 3.0,−11.6 −12.2,−12.2
Constrained game
Player 1
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,137.7 0.0,153.8
1 s 137.7,0.0 3.1∗,3.1∗ 3.1∗,3.0∗
l 153.8,0.0 3.0∗,3.1∗ 3.0∗,3.0∗
pf = 1.565, Fs = 360 and Fl = 413.
The equilibria of the unconstrained game (shown in bold) are (0, l) and (l,0), while the equi-
librium of the constrained game is (s, s). The price floor is binding for both the s- and the l-type
in all of the oligopoly outcomes (as indicated by the ∗’s). Price is 1.567 (the l-type monopoly price)
in the unconstrained game, and 1.565 (the value of the floor) in the constrained game.
B.2 Blockaded entry (High floor)
Again we assume that pf > 1.563 which is the Nash equilibrium price of the unconstrained game.
We set Fs = 335 and we suppose that Fl = 388.5. The constrained and unconstrained games can
be seen in Table 14.
The equilibria of the unconstrained game are (s, l) and (l, s), while the equilibrium of the con-
strained game is (s, s). Prices are 1.548 and 1.417 (the Nash prices for the s- and l-types respectively
in the (s, l) and (l, s) markets) in the unconstrained game, and 1.565 (the value of the floor) in the
constrained game.
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Table 14: Blockaded entry
Unconstrained game
Player 1
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,162.7 0.0,178.6
1 s 162.7,0.0 27.9,27.9 13.4,29.0
l 178.6,0.0 29.0,13.4 12.6,12.6
Constrained game
Player 1
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,162.7 0.0,178.6
1 s 162.7,0.0 28.1∗,28.1∗ 28.1∗,27.8∗
l 178.6,0.0 27.8∗,28.1∗ 27.8∗,27.8∗
pf = 1.565, Fs = 335 and Fl = 388.5.
B.3 Blockaded entry (Low floor)
We assume that the floor is set to a lower level so that it is only binding for the l-type in the (s, l)
(or (l, s)) equilibrium. Specifically, we set the floor to be 1.417 < pf < 1.548, where the bounds are
given by the unconstrained equilibrium prices in the (s, l) outcome for the s- and l-types respec-
tively. We set Fs = 350 and Fl = 404.5 The unconstrained and constrained games can be seen in
Table 15.
Table 15: Blockaded entry
Unconstrained game
Player 1
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,147.7 0.0,162.6
1 s 147.7,0.0 12.9,0.0129 −1.6,13.0
l 162.6,0.0 13.0,−0.0016 −3.4,−3.4
Constrained game
Player 1
0 s l
0 0.0,0.0 0.0,147.7 0.0,162.6
1 s 147.7,0.0 12.9,12.9 10.5,12.3∗
l 162.6,0.0 12.3∗,10.5 −44.1∗,−44.1∗
pf = 1.565, Fs = 350 and Fl = 404.5.
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The equilibria of the unconstrained game are (l,0) and (0, l), while the equilibrium of the con-
strained game is (s, s). Price is 1.567 (the l-type monopoly price) in the unconstrained game, and
1.563 (the Nash price in the (s, s) market) in the constrained game. Note that in this case the price
floor is only binding for the l-type, and so not in equilibrium.
C Description of the clustering algorithm
In this appendix we describe the construction of neighborhoods. Consider an isolated metropoli-
tan area composed of L potential store locations. In the data we define n as the set of geographic
coordinates and street intersection pairs that were ever occupied by a gasoline station between
1991 and 2001. Because of entry and exit, n is thus larger than the total number of active station at
any point in time.
The clustering algorithm proceeds iteratively by grouping stations with similar spatial charac-
teristics until the allocation of stores in groups is stable. We define the degree of similarity between
two locations using the euclidian distance (dij expressed in Km), and an indicator variable equal
to one if they share at least one street. Each location can be characterized by up to two streets.
The key parameter of the algorithm is δ. It determines a threshold distance such that two
locations are considered in the same local market even if they do not have street in common. This
parameter is important since two stores can be very close in euclidian distance, but the survey
company does not locate them along the same street. Intuitively this parameter is a penalty added
to the euclidian distance between two stores that are not connected by a common street. We fix
the value of δ to 1/4 Km, which is a very small distance. Note that the number of stable clusters is
rapidly decreasing in δ.
We initiate the algorithm by defining initial neighborhoods, as the set of possible street inter-
sections in the city. Let Mt be the allocation at iteration t. Mt is a mapping from locations to
neighborhoods:
Mt = {mt1,mt2, ...,mtL} , (20)
where mti is the neighborhood id associated with location i.
1. At iteration t, update the assignment of store i ∈ L:
(a) Calculate the distance between location i and the center of neighborhood mi denoted
by lmi
35:
D(i,mi) =
δ if |mi| = 1,d(li, lmi) otherwise. (21)
35We definite lm as the average latitude/longitude coordinate of locations belonging to m.
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(b) Calculate the distance from li to all other neighborhoods. For each neighborhood m 6=
mi:
D(i,m) =
d(li, lm) + δ if si /∈ Sm,d(ki, lm) otherwise, (22)
where si is the vector of street indices of location i and Sm =
⋃
j∈m sj is the union of
streets for all locations in market m. Let m∗i 6= mti the closest neighborhood for location
i.
(c) If D∗i < D(i, lmti) set m
t+1
i = m
∗
i . Otherwise leave location i assignment unchanged.
2. Repeat the previous steps for all i ∈ L.
3. IfMt+1 6=Mt repeat step (1) and (2). Otherwise stop.
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